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PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS DURING AND




A deep and abiding ambiguity affects the subject of the United
Nations and human rights. Human rights are at once a central concern
of the United Nations, as well as a consistent frustration to it. Before
examining this ambiguity in regard to the UN and conflict situations, a
few introductory comments are in order.
On the one hand, the United Nations was founded, in part, to pro-
tect human rights. According to articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter, a
fundamental purpose of the United Nations is to "promote universal
respect for and observance of human rights." Specifically, there are
three principal ways this objective is pursued.
One is standard-setting, or articulating and legalizing the interna-
tional human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
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and the large number of other covenants and declarations that define
and constitute "internationally recognized human rights." A second way
is promoting human rights in the sense of educating the world commu-
nity, of promulgating human rights standards, and of disseminating and
coordinating human rights information.
The third and most problematic way concerns the implementation
of human rights, which in turn involves at least three subtasks. There is
the obligation to monitor human rights violations, including efforts to
anticipate, and to seek to prevent violations through early warning,
mediation or conciliation and through publicizing possible or alleged
violations. Secondly, there is the obligation to respond to violations
through pressure or what is called the "mobilization of shame." Finally,
as a last resort there is the possibility of taking stronger action to deter
or reduce violations by imposing sanctions or other punitive measures
and to secure relief for the victims of those violations by delivering
humanitarian aid.
These objectives and tasks are pursued and carried out by certain
UN organizations and agencies, four of which deserve special attention.
One is the Human Rights Commission, which is a functional committee
of the Economic and Social Council. In the early days, it undertook to
draft the Universal Declaration, which under the direction of Eleanor
Roosevelt was completed and adopted in 1948. Ever since, the commis-
sion has been responsible for developing and overseeing the vast array
of international human rights instruments and documents that now ex-
ists. Beyond that, the commission supervises numerous working groups
on subjects such as slavery, indigenous populations, minorities, deten-
tion, etc., as well as appointing special rapporteurs to selected countries
to monitor the human rights performance of those countries. It also
appoints special rapporteurs to supervise compliance with standards
regarding torture, emergency and the like. Lastly, the Human Rights
Commission meets once a year to hear reports and recommendations
regarding the human rights performance of selected states.
The second body of note is the so-called Human Rights Commit-
tee, which is authorized in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights to supervise compliance with that convention. The
Human Rights Committee entertains annual reports from member states
and in addition, accepts complaints by individual citizens in the case of
those governments who have signed an additional protocol.
The third institution to be mentioned is the UN Center for Human
Rights in Geneva, which is the office of the UN Secretariat charged
with conducting fact-finding and producing reports in connection with
the activities of the Human Rights Commission and the Human Rights
Committee. The Center also supports the work of the special
rapporteurs. Finally, there is the recently-appointed UN High Commis-
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sioner for Human Rights who is at present Jose Ayala-Lasso. His main
responsibility is to oversee and coordinate all of the various UN human
rights activities.
However, if human rights is a central concern of the UN, which
commands a certain degree of institutional commitment, the subject is
also a consistent frustration. The frustration is basically financial and
structural. It is financial, in the sense that less than one percent of the
overall UN budget goes to the promulgation, promotion, and implemen-
tation of human rights, a fact made even more alarming by the failure
of the major powers, including the United States, faithfully to pay their
UN dues.
There are also structural problems and these are perhaps the most
important of all. Not least of them is the uncoordinated proliferation of
UN human rights activities. High hopes have been expressed that the
new Commissioner of Human Rights can help to alleviate some of the
problems, but that remains to be seen given his small staff and his
minuscule funding.
The larger difficulty, however, begins with the fact that the United
Nations is not an effective international authority, one capable of con-
sistently enforcing international human rights. Therefore, even though
human rights standards may be adequately articulated, and relatively
well disseminated and affirmed (in theory), there are serious deficien-
cies regarding implementation. In the case, for example, of the Human
Rights Commission, it lacks the necessary teeth to enforce its judg-
ments regarding the human rights violations of one country or another.
Instead of the impartial and reliable system of human rights adjudica-
tion and implementation that was originally envisioned, standards get
applied sporadically and selectively, and in a way that is subject most
decidedly to political influence.
A passage from a recent report concerning human rights and UN
field operations in the Iran-Iraq war highlights this problem of political
influence:
[During the Iran-Iraq war,] the United Nations had shown a distinct prefer-
ence for Iraq in its public statements and actions, reflecting the undisguised
support for Iraq on the part of the three Western permanent members of the
Security Counsel, the United States, Britain and France.
The Iraqi government's use of chemical weapons against Kurdish civil-
ians and fighters alike in 1987 and 1988 have provoked hardly a squeak from
the UN. Even when Saddam Hussein's repression of the Kurds drove hun-
dreds of thousands from their villages in the North in 1988 and led to the dis-
appearances of tens of thousands more ... the UN system remained disen-
gaged from Iraqi atrocities.
[After the 1991 Gulf War,] there came a 180-degree turn in the treat-
ment that UN accorded to Iraq's human rights abuses-from lassitude to
forthright condemnation in the strongest possible terms. The world body's
1996]
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public rhetoric on human rights in Iraq changed... in the light of political
shifts by the major powers.'
II. THE UN ROLE REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT: TWO
EXAMPLES
We shall now take up two cases illustrating UN efforts to imple-
ment human rights during and after conflict, namely, the examples of
the former Yugoslavia and El Salvador. The former Yugoslavia illus-
trates as poignantly as any case the frustrations that attend UN attempts
to implement human rights, particularly the structural obstacles I allud-
ed to, including the problem of political pressure. As an effort to pro-
tect human rights, this case can only be judged as a disastrous failure
on the part of the UN and supporting actors. By contrast, El Salvador
represents a more positive case. If for no other reason than to keep
spirits up, it is useful to examine why the second example worked out
so favorably. Having considered both cases, we may draw a few ten-
tative comparative conclusions.
A. Former Yugoslavia
In this case, the grossest of human rights violations were commit-
ted deliberately and systematically throughout the four years of war,
with only the mildest and most ineffectual of responses from the United
Nations and supporting actors.2 The conclusion of the Human Rights
Watch Report is hard to gainsay:
UN peacekeeping and other efforts in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
have been marked by timidity, disorganization, unnecessary delay and po-
litical indecision .... UN operations in the region have been hampered by
competition between member states and the Secretary General; disputes be-
tween the Secretary General and UN personnel in the field; member states'
unwillingness to commit necessary financial resources; and violations of the
arms and trade embargoes by several nations.3
Such malfeasance is epitomized by the experience of Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, Poland's first post-communist prime minister who in Au-
gust, 1992, was appointed UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in
1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TIE LOST AGENDA: HUMAN RIGHTS AND UN FIELD OPERA-
TIONS 135 (1993).
2. We should not allow the claim regarding the need to reconsider the valid-
ity of human rights in their present form, expressed several times in the confer-
ence, to obscure the fact that in cases like the former Yugoslavia, certain prima-
ry human rights protection against arbitrary killing, torture, abusive confine-
ment, forcible relocation, etc. are indisputably binding upon all parties, and con-
stitute a clear standard against which all participants should be held account-
able.
3. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 85-86.
[Vol. 4:1
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS
the former Yugoslavia. By all accounts, Mazowiecki's performance was
exceptional. His dedication, integrity and conscientiousness were of the
highest quality in face of huge obstacles, including all of the shortcom-
ings I briefly alluded to earlier, and some others in addition. Nearly
three years after he was appointed, Mazowiecki summarily resigned his
job in protest. His career as Special Rapporteur symbolizes the diffi-
culties and shortcomings of the UN's approach to protecting human
rights.
Mazowiecki was appointed to his job in an unprecedented emer-
gency session of the Human Rights Commission. Because of the blatant
evidence of severe human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia, it
called a special session and immediately selected the former Polish
prime minister, giving him the following mandate:
[T]o investigate firsthand the human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia
and to receive relevant, credible information on the situation there from gov-
ernments, individuals, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations
on a continuing basis, and to avail himself of the existing mechanisms of the
Commission on Human Rights.4
Over the three-year period, Mazowiecki issued eighteen human
rights reports addressing the allegations of ethnic cleansing, genocide,
mass rape, and the other gross atrocities characteristic of the conflict.
The reports were widely respected and repeatedly heralded as conscien-
tious, trenchant, objective, and unsparing. Mazowiecki reported viola-
tions on all sides with admirable impartiality and unrelenting thorough-
ness.
As early as August 1992, and repeatedly thereafter, Mazowiecki
urged that certain remedies be undertaken, some of which were eventu-
ally adopted as Security Council Resolutions, but most of which were
never effectively enforced. A few notable examples:
o That the mandate of UNPROFOR-the UN protection force-
should be expanded so as to include deactivating all heavy weaponry in
the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
o Pressure should be put on military authorities to discontinue the
policies of ethnic cleansing (Resolution 771, August 1992, condemning
ethnic cleansing).
o Military authorities should be warned that they and subordinates
are liable for war crimes (subsequently reformulated and passed as
Resolution 827 in May 1993, authorizing the establishment of the Inter-
national War Crimes Tribunal--one of Mazowiecki's few successful
recommendations).
4. Special Rapporteur Report of 28 August 1992, EICN.4/1992/S-1/9, cited in
Konstanty Gebert, Reporting is Not Enough, in Wrr No PEACE TO KEEP Ill (Ben Cohen &
George Stamkoski eds., 1995)[hereinafter Special Rapporteur Report].
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o That detention camps be dismaritled, prisoners freed, and perpe-
trators of atrocities brought to justice.
o That "safe areas" be created for protecting refugees (eventually
culminating in Resolution 836, issued in June 1993). The Resolution so
designating Srebrenica and five other locations is arresting: "to enable
UNPROFOR to take all necessary measures, including the use of force,
to deter attacks, monitor ceasefire, [and] promote withdrawal of military
units ... in and around the safe areas."5 As the policy of safe areas
unfolded, Mazowiecki appealed urgently to Boutros-Ghali to supply
adequate troops to enforce security. Tragically, such support was, of
course, never forthcoming.
In carrying out his task, Mazowiecki encountered considerable
criticism. Certain of the NGOs believed he should have named names
in his report. He contended, to the contrary, that the indictment and
prosecution of individual offenders was the obligation of the War
Crimes Tribunal. From his point of view, his main objective was to
identify crimes and to call them to the attention of the world communi-
ty, despite the fact that he received little cooperation and even active
hostility from all parties, particularly the Serbs.
There were, in addition, other difficulties. Mazowiecki was never
sure, he said, whether the tiny budget allotted for his operation would
be met. When he requested human rights field workers early on in his
assignment, they did not arrive until six months later! Beyond that, he
encountered significant structural problems. There was very little coor-
dination and, consequently, considerable bureaucratic confusion and
obstructionism. In some parts of the UN, commitment was weak, and
the implementation of human rights regarded as of secondary impor-
tance. The only UN agency obliged to consider Mazowiecki's reports
was the Commission on Human Rights, a body that, as we saw, met
only once a year and was already overloaded with extensive responsi-
bilities. The Security Council was not obliged to consider the reports of
the Special Rapporteur, and it did so only in a very irregular and des-
ultory fashion.
Mazowiecki was, in short, faced with an example of colossal insti-
tutional ineptitude and weakness of will. From the start, he was frus-
trated at having his reports ignored:
[I]t is not possible to limit the mandate to the preparation of reports contain-
ing facts and expressing opinions which are then presented to UN bodies. The
mandate should lead to urgent and concrete activities to benefit the suffering
populations. Atrocities were constantly being accepted and glossed over by
people in various areas of responsibility relating to the conflict .... It was
obvious that my job fulfilled simply an alibi function .... [T]hose who ap-
5. SCOR Res. 836, 19 (1993), reprinted in, 1993 U.N.Y.B. 458, U.N. Sales No. E.94.I.1
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pointed me probably thought we can at least speak out about and condemn
the atrocities .... Yet from the very beginning, I was of the opinion, that
involvement is only possible if I could help people on the spot and not just
write papers to satisfy the UN and its members.'
On July 27, 1995, Mazowiecki became the highest ranking UN
official ever to resign in protest. A short time before, UNPROFOR had
failed to prevent the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, two UN-designated
safe areas. This lack of determination symbolized for Mazowiecki the
failure of the entire UN policy for protecting human rights in the midst
of conflict. His words of resignation are memorable and exactly to the
point:
The international community should abandon its hypocrisy towards Bosnia.
For we are claiming that we are defending it while we are, in fact, abandon-
ing it .... One cannot speak about the protection of human rights with credi-
bility when confronted with the lack of consistency and courage displayed by
the international community and its leaders.!
There is a sobering epilogue to Mazowiecki's resignation and to his
concluding assessment of the failed role of the UN in the former Yugo-
slavia. In the aftermath of the conflict, the UN plays no significant role
in protecting human rights or anything else there. The Dayton Accords
were neither brokered nor are they primarily enforced by the United
Nations. What is more, the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe has been charged with the responsibility of monitoring hu-
man rights in Bosnia rather than the UN and UN human rights institu-
tions are only marginally involved. These facts speak for themselves.
B. El Salvador
The UN role in protecting human rights during and after the bloody
twelve-year conflict in El Salvador is a very different and rather more
encouraging story. A recent report published by the Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights-Improvising History: A Critical Evaluation of the
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador' (known as
ONUSAL)-judges that mission to have been "fundamentally a suc-
cess."9 And this judgement is confirmed by a Human Rights Watch
Report which states there is a rare consensus among Salvadorans of
divergent political views that ONUSAL's presence has, in fact, dramat-
ically reduced the incidence of human rights abuses both before and
6. Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 4, at 113-114.
7. Id. at 111.
8. IMPROVISING HISTORY: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER
MISSION IN EL SALVADOR: A REPORT OF THE LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
DEc. 1995(New York 1995)[hercinafter IMPROVISING HISTORY].
9. Id. at 4.
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during the cease fire. The Human Rights Watch Report summarizes the
essentials effectively:
The case of El Salvador shows both the feasibility and the importance of a
more energetic human rights agenda. Because of the sophistication of the
Salvadorans themselves and the vision of the UN officials involved, human
rights played a central role in the UN-sponsored peace process. Even before
the peace accord, one hundred UN Human Rights Monitors were deployed in
the country to deter abuses and to build a climate of confidence in which
both sides could make the compromises necessary for ending the war. The
size of the monitoring force and its deployment throughout the country made
it a credible force, and its right to enter detention facilities without prior
notice gave it a unique ability to verify detention practices. The peace accord,
signed in 1992, provided for continued UN monitoring. It also established a
Truth Commission to provide an official accounting of the abuses of the prior
twelve years, a restructuring of the security forces to neutralize some of the
most abusive agencies, and a purging from the army of those who had been
responsible for gross abuses. While problems remain, the prospects for lasting
peace are greater in El Salvador than in other conflict-torn countries where
the UN has had a presence-for example, in Cambodia, Somalia or, of course,
the former Yugoslavia. The prominent role accorded human rights is an im-
portant reason why."0
To be sure, neither of these reports is altogether uncritical. Both
register objections and apprehensions regarding the performance of
ONUSAL. Moreover, particularly the Lawyers' Committee Report high-
lights some deep tensions between politics and human rights implemen-
tation which affect the situation in El Salvador. Still, when it comes to
the UN and human rights-especially in the light of the UN's record in
the former Yugoslavia, any good news is to be appreciated.
Although it is important not to forget some of the difficulties, the
way the UN addressed human rights in El Salvador made a constructive
contribution and set what are possibly some very important precedents.
As it turned out, human rights emerged as the foundation for an eventu-
al peace agreement between the government and the FMLN (the
Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional). In the San Jose Accords
arrived at in July 1990, mutual commitment to human rights was the
thing both sides could agree upon even though they went on fighting
and even though the continuing peace talks would not produce a final
peace settlement until January 1992.
The point is that the UN interjected itself into the Salvadoran con-
flict in the name of human rights and it was precisely devotion to the
cause of human rights that helped advance the peace settlement. The
real innovation of the accords was the commitment both sides made to
international verification. That meant a large, resident mission of for-
eign observers with the right to move freely as monitors, to investigate
10. HUMAN RIGHTs WATCH, supra note 1, at 2.
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alleged human rights violations, to issue reports, to make recommenda-
tions, and so on. Although it is not clear that either side fully under-
stood what it was signing onto when it admitted human rights monitors
into the country, it was these very arrangements that helped the peace
process forward.
There are several reasons for that. One is that the presence of the
monitors discouraged either side from breaking off the peace talks.
Second, once the final peace accord was signed, there was a basis for
increasing the supervisory role of the UN in working with the police
and the military to implement the accord. Third, ONUSAL's presence
very likely had a deterrent effect on the conduct of the conflict itself
and in the words of the Lawyers' Committee Report would "actually
save lives as the war entered its final phase."1 In fact, then Secretary
General Perez de Cuellar used this argument in the Security Council to
recommend that the observer mission be expanded before the end of the
hostilities.
Moreover, human rights provisions were central to the final peace
accord itself. For example, there was included in the final agreement
provision for a Truth Commission whose obligation it was to investi-
gate and report on human rights violations which had taken place
throughout the Salvadoran conflict. The Truth Commission heard
roughly 2000 witnesses in connection with some 22,000 cases of al-
leged human rights violations.
In March 1993, the Commission issued its report From Madness to
Hope calling for complete military reform, a special investigation of
state-tolerated death squads, a ten-year prohibition on holding public
office for gross human rights violators, and permanent exclusion of
such offenders from the military. In the process of establishing that
human rights violations were "part of a deliberate military strategy," the
commission went so far as to identify the names of individuals it found
to be responsible for the most serious human rights offenses, and then
proceeded to set up an Ad Hoc Commission to oversee the purging of
those offenders from the military. As a result, one hundred and three
military officers were dismissed.
It must be admitted that the army dragged its feet in carrying out
the recommendations of the Truth Commission and the Ad Hoc Com-
mission. Nevertheless, the fact that a number of these people were
called to account in public and were actually dismissed from their offi-
cial positions was itself a very important step forward. In addition, it
appears that the idea of the Ad Hoc Commission was a creative com-
promise, given the military's resistance to war crimes trials for military
11. IMPROVISING HISTORY, supra note 8, at 14.
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personnel. Review commissions of this sort can be effective informal
"instruments for change where judicial power is weak or corrupt."' 2
Indeed, the Truth Commission called attention to the lack of a
reliable, objective and impartial judicial system. It recommended re-
placement of the members of the supreme court and called for complete
judicial reform, as was recommended in the peace accord.
Despite this impressive record, there were liabilities that need to be
mentioned. For one thing, many of the human rights monitors were ill-
prepared for their task. There were also special problems of coordina-
tion between the Human Rights Center in Geneva and the UN office in
New York, which was responsible for peacekeeping. 3 Lastly, insuf-
ficient attention was given to the question of institution building. Ac-
cording to the Lawyers Committee Report,
interviews with ONUSAL members throughout 1994 indicate[d] they were
sensitive to the need to reorient the mission away from traditional human
rights verification toward technical assistance geared to consolidating the
administration of justice and [other forms of institutionalized] human rights
protection. Yet it was not until late in the year, as the mission was expected
to end, that concrete steps were taken. The failure to give tangible support to
the courts, [to the police,] and [to] the Ombudsman can be explained by
factors on both the UN and the Salvadoran sides [poor financing, preoccupa-
tion with day-to-day activities, etc.] .... Many mission staff interviewed for
this report cite[d] the neglect of institution-building and judicial reform as a
lesson to be learned from their experience in El Salvador, and recom-
mend[ed] that these areas be considered a priority in future missions. 4
III. CONCLUSION
The most striking single feature of both cases is this: Violation of
human fights is an important source of conflict and compliance with
human fights is a crucial foundation for peace.
The recent conflict in the former Yugoslavia illustrates dramatically
the first part of this proposition-that human rights violation leads to
conflict. At bottom, the four-year war in that region has been about
human fights violations of the most deliberate, systematic, and gro-
tesque sort. But beyond that, the peace settlement illustrates the second
part as well. Although not UN-arranged, the Dayton Accords explicitly
builds in human rights as a basis for peace. Annex 6 of the Accords
establishes an elaborate human rights machinery in Bosnia, including a
Commission of Human Rights, a Human Rights Ombudsman, and a
12. HUMAN RIGHTs WATCH, supra note 1, at 32-33.
13. See IMPROVISING HISTORY, supra note 8, at 60 & 61 (calling for extensive "re-
structuring of the Human Rights Centre" and it is possible the new High Commis-
sioner of Human Rights will attend to this problem, as he promises).
14. Id. at 111-112.
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Human Rights Chamber for processing human rights claims. Further-
more, the Hague War Crimes Tribunal directly touches the question of
accountability for human rights offenses during the war. All these pro-
visions are understood as contributing to the conditions of justice, sta-
bility, and peace in Bosnia.
El Salvador also illustrates the truth of both sides of the proposi-
tion. Human rights violations were at the center of war, and the exten-
sive attention paid to confronting those violations, and to reforming the
institutions that produced or tolerated them was indispensable in build-
ing peace in that troubled country.
While events in the former Yugoslavia do not inspire confidence
regarding the UN's capacity to protect effectively human rights during
and after conflict, the experience in El Salvador goes some way to
offset the record of failure. It appears that the UN can be effective
under certain conditions. There must be, as there were in El Salvador,
parties jointly committed both to the reduction of human rights viola-
tions and to UN peacekeeping efforts. There must also be a disposition
on the part of the UN to supply adequate staff and resources, and to
coordinate carefully its peacekeeping operations.
So long as conditions are "ripe," as they were in El Salvador, and
there exists the political and institutional will on the part of the UN,
human rights can get secured and promoted during and after times of
conflict. However, when the conditions are not propitious, and place a
great strain on the capacities of the UN, as in the former Yugoslavia,
efforts to protect human rights must be radically rethought.
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